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Abstract 
Upstream vs. Downstream CO2 Trading: A 
Comparison for the Electricity Context 
EPRG Working Paper    1010 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics  1018 
Benjamin F. Hobbs, James Bushnell and Frank A. 
Wolak  
 
In electricity, “downstream” CO2 regulation requires retail suppliers to 
buy energy from a mix of sources so that their weighted emissions 
satisfy a standard.  It has been argued that such “load-based” regulation 
would solve emissions leakage, cost consumers less, and provide more 
incentive for energy efficiency than traditional source-based cap-and-
trade programs. Because pure load-based trading complicates spot 
power markets, variants (GEAC and CO2RC) that separate emissions 
attributes from energy have been proposed.  When all energy producers 
and consumers come under such a system, these load-based programs 
are equivalent to source-based trading in which emissions allowances 
are allocated by various rules, and have no necessary cost advantage.  
The GEAC and CO2RC systems are equivalent to giving allowances 
free to generators, and requiring consumers either to subsidize 
generation or buy back excess allowances, respectively.  As avoided 
energy costs under source-based and pure load-based trading are 
equal, the latter provides no additional incentive for energy efficiency.  
The speculative benefits of load-based systems are unjustified in light of 
their additional administrative complexity and cost, the threat that they 
pose to the competitiveness and efficiency of electricity spot markets, 
and the complications that would arise when transition to 
a federal cap-and-trade system occurs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
As climate policy continues to evolve around the world, there are continuing 
debates over where in the supply chain to impose Greenhouse Gas (GHG) limits.   
Proposals range from far upstream at the sale of fossil fuels to far downstream at 
the purchase of manufactured products and energy by ultimate consumers.  In 
the power industry, the upstream vs. downstream discussion has focused on 
whether to place the burden of compliance on plants that produce electricity, on 
the companies that distribute power, or even individual retail consumers.   This 
has, for example, been the focus of debate over how to implement California’s 
AB32 and the subsequent Western Climate Initiative. 
 
There are five broad alternatives for implementing GHG regulations in the 
electricity sector.  The first is to regulate emissions at least partially 
“downstream” by placing a reporting and compliance obligation on retail 
providers of energy (here called “Load Serving Entities”, or LSEs).  Under this 
basic “load-based” approach, LSEs would have to demonstrate that the power 
they have purchased represents a mix of sources that achieves a specified target 
in terms of carbon intensity.  Because electricity in a looped transmission 
network flows according to the laws of physics, it is impossible to determine the 
GHG emissions caused by each MWh of electricity consumed by each LSE.  For 
this reason, an administrative procedure must be used to assign GHG emissions 
to each MWh of electricity; in the basic load-based system, this is accomplished 
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by assigning emissions to bilateral power supply purchases based on the 
emissions rate of the generator who sells the power.   
 
The load-based approach is similar in philosophy to other downstream 
mechanisms, such as the idea of tradable personal carbon allowances (PCAs) 
(Fleming, 1997) which have been extensively discussed in the UK.  For example, 
the UK government recently proposed personal carbon “credit cards”, in which 
carbon emissions associated with a consumer’s purchases would be tracked and 
then limited to the number of credits that consumer was allocated or bought 
(Lane et al., 2008).  Thus, consumers would be responsible for limiting 
emissions, analogous to the responsibility of LSEs under load-based proposals.  
Similar proposals have been made for Sweden (Varnäs & Nykvist, 2009) and 
California (Niemeyer et al., 2008).     
 
The focus of this paper is on a comparison of load-based trading with the second, 
more upstream alternative for GHG regulation.  The latter is “pure” source-based 
cap-and-trade system for power generators similar to systems such as the Title 
IV SO2 trading system, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the EU 
Emissions Trading System.  A source-based approach places compliance 
responsibility on the facility that is emitting the pollution (the source).   Each 
facility would need to acquire emissions permits to offset their total emissions.  
However, this system has the disadvantage of not covering product or electricity 
imports, which means that emissions can “leak” out if imports from uncapped 
regions increase.   
 
A third alternative would be to implement some hybrid cap-and-trade system 
that would effectively act like a source-based program for plants within a 
jurisdiction, while still trying to capture the emissions impact of power imports 
in some fashion.  This approach seems most advanced in the western U.S., where 
several climate policy initiatives are underway.2  There, the “first seller” 
approach currently favored by California and the Western Climate Initiative is 
the most widely discussed version of this hybrid concept.3  A fourth alternative is 
to move further upstream in the supply chain, regulating the fossil fuel inputs to 
power plants.  The fifth and last alternative would be to focus GHG reduction 
efforts on mechanisms other than cap-and-trade, such as stringent renewable 
portfolio standards.    
   
A choice among these approaches should consider various economic and 
environmental goals.  These include, among others, efficiency of system dispatch 
                                                 
2 California’s “Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006” (AB 32) established a goal of reducing the state’s 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020.  The bill covers more than 80% of the 
state’s CO2 emissions. The discussions have since expanded to include the members of Western Climate 
Initiative, which involves six other western states as well as some Canadian provinces.   
3 Under the California first seller proposal, a first seller is an entity that first brings power into the state’s 
market (CMAC, 2007).  All generation units located in the California ISO control area are first sellers of 
electricity.  So in this sense, the first-seller approach is a source-based approach because it is 
straightforward to determine the GHG emissions per MWh of energy produced from the technical 
operating characteristics of the in-state generation unit.  However, for imports of electricity, the first seller 
is the entity importing the power into the state.  An administrative procedure assigns a GHG emissions 
rate per MWh of energy imported into California for each importing entity. 
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and the performance of wholesale and retail electricity markets, the efficiency of 
investment in new generation facilities and energy efficiency technologies, 
consumer costs, administrative simplicity, effectiveness in achieving GHG 
reduction goals, and future compatibility with multi-state or federal GHG 
regulation.  Bluemel (2009), Burtraw (2008), Bushnell (2008), and Van Horn 
(2008) discuss many of these considerations.   
 
Several advantages have been claimed for the basic load-based trading proposal.  
One is that it, along with hybrid approaches, are claimed to regulate the GHG 
content of imported electricity.  This advantage is overstated.  Although firms 
would not be able to avoid compliance by physically moving their sources of 
production out of the state (“leakage”), they would be able achieve much the 
same ends by “reshuffling” their purchases of imported energy to originate from 
clean sources (Bushnell, 2008).4   The issues of leakage and shuffling in California 
have been analyzed elsewhere using modeling approaches.  One study finds that 
certain versions of load-based, source-based, and first-seller based trading result 
in the same amount of leakage and contract shuffling, and estimates that contract 
shuffling will eliminate nearly all the purported emissions reductions that would 
be accomplished by any California-only system that attempts to attribute 
emissions to imports (Chen et al., 2008a).  Other studies have focused on the 
effect of alternative allowance allocation schemes in the context of a first seller 
system (Palmer et al. 2009; Bushnell & Chen, 2009).  
 
A second claimed advantage of load-based trading is that it would lower costs to 
consumers by avoiding bequeathing windfall profits to power producers and 
allowing LSEs to pay a premium only to cleaner producers, unlike source-based 
systems which raise prices paid to all producers (Synapse Energy, 2007; 
Bluemel, 2009).  Experience with the EU Emissions Trading System has shown 
that high prices for CO2 translate into higher prices of electricity, and that profits 
increase (Chen et al., 2008b).  That increase has been very controversial, and this 
experience motivated stakeholder groups in the western US to search for other 
trading-based systems for reducing the power sector’s carbon emissions.   The 
increase in profits had two sources.  One was the economic rent associated with 
emissions allowances that were largely given away to producers under Phase I of 
the EU system.  The second source is what we call the “rents of clean generation” 
in which clean plants benefited from higher energy prices because those price 
increases exceeded their expense of allowances.  Some advocates of a load-based 
system claim that it would lower generation profits, and consumers would 
thereby benefit.    
 
A third advantage claimed for load-based trading is that, compared to source-
based systems, it would provide more motivation to LSEs to sponsor energy 
efficiency programs (Bluemel, 2009).   By putting the compliance burden on 
LSEs, who are in a better position to implement such programs than generators, 
it is argued that such programs would be pursued more aggressively.   
 
                                                 
4 Several options for mitigating reshuffling have been suggested (Bluemel, 2009), but they remain among 
the most controversial and legally vulnerable aspects of load-based and first-seller based programs. 
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These claimed advantages have also been made for the related proposal of 
personal carbon allowances.  It has been argued that PCAs could be surrendered 
when consumers buy imported goods, addressing carbon leakage; if given away 
for free, PCAs could lessen consumer costs and windfall producer profits; and by 
making consumers more conscious of the carbon associated with purchases, they 
would motivate carbon reductions more readily than would price increases due 
to carbon taxes.  It is also argued that: PCAs can cover more sectors than source-
based allowances; they are more acceptable than taxes; PCAs can be used to 
avoid regressive impacts of carbon regulation on the poor; and they promote the 
building of community commitment to sustainability (Harwatt, 2008; Hyams, 
2009). 
 
Our purpose here is to undertake a model-based investigation of the second and 
third claims for load-based trading (lower consumer costs and greater 
motivation to pursue energy efficiency).  In order to focus on those claims and to 
simplify the derivations, we disregard power imports and the associated issues 
of leakage and contract shuffling, which have been investigated using more 
sophisticated models elsewhere (Chen et al., 2008a).   Thus, our analysis is most 
relevant to a situation where imports are a small portion of total demand—for 
instance, if California successfully entices all the other western states, as well as 
relevant Canadian provinces, to join the Western Climate Initiative.  
 
We investigate the two claims by constructing simple models of a load-based 
GHG trading system and then comparing it to source-based trading.  We find that 
source-based trading and the basic load-based system provide the same financial 
incentive for investments in energy efficiency.  Furthermore, load-based 
programs are shown to cost consumers no less than source-based systems in 
which all allowances are auctioned and the proceeds used to benefit consumers.5  
However, in terms of administrative complexity, compatibility with existing spot-
market based power markets, and consistency with likely federal GHG 
legislation, load-based systems have serious disadvantages compared to any of 
the other options.  Therefore, contrary to some claims, the resulting cost of 
energy to consumers would likely be higher under a load-based trading system. 
 
Because basic load-based trading requires LSEs to keep track of whom they buy 
power from and the associated emissions, power from different sources would 
fetch different prices, as we show later.  As a consequence, retail entities will 
either be unable to, or be discouraged from buying energy in spot markets run by 
entities such as the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) 
(Gillenwater and Breidenreich, 2009).  This is because CAISO-type spot markets 
(of which there are six in the US) do not track the emissions associated with 
different sources, and cannot sell different “flavors” of power at different prices 
depending on the emissions associated with their production.  Similarly, low 
emitting producers would not want to sell power in such markets because they 
would not obtain the premium they could get from LSEs who desire their cleaner 
power (Bluemel, 2009).  This disincentive to participate in the CAISO-type 
                                                 
5 Chen et al. (2008a) have also established the equivalency of source-based and the pure load-based 
program, but their derivation is much more complex than ours, and they do not consider the GEAC and 
CO2RC load-based systems. 
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markets would lower their liquidity, and could even endanger reliability by 
giving operators of those markets fewer resources to draw upon during system 
emergencies. 
 
Due to these concerns, variants of load-based trading have been proposed that 
unbundle emissions from energy, so that power producers can sell energy to 
CAISO-type markets while selling, in a separate market, the emissions attributed 
to consumers.   These are the Generation Emissions Attribute Certificate (GEAC) 
and CO2 Reduction Credit (CO2RC) systems, which are proposed by Gillenwater 
and Breidenreich (2009) and Michel and Nielsen (2008), respectively.   We also 
develop simple models of those systems, and conclude that, like the basic load-
based approach, their costs to consumers are no less than, and likely greater 
than, source-based trading.   Indeed, as we show, these systems can be viewed as 
being equivalent to source-based trading systems in which unusual (and 
complex) rules are used to allocate emissions allowances to producers to the 
detriment of consumers. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we present a simple model of a 
power and emissions allowance price equilibrium for the basic load-based 
trading system.  Then in Section 3, we describe a model for source-based trading, 
and then demonstrate in Section 4 the equivalence of the two systems in terms of 
total cost of energy to final consumers–under assumptions that ignore the 
potentially higher consumer costs of a load-based approach due to possible 
damage to CAISO-type spot markets.   A numerical example is given that 
illustrates the equivalence.  Section 5 addresses the question of whether 
incentives for sponsoring energy efficiency programs are greater under the basic 
load-based systems.  In Sections 6 and 7, we analyze the GEAC and CO2RC 
proposals to unbundle emissions attributes from power in a load-based system, 
and establish their equivalence to source-based trading systems that involve 
significant subsidies of producers.  Conclusions are presented in Section 8. 
 
2. Market Equilibrium Model for Basic Load-Based Trading 
The model for a load-based system consists of submodels of LSE and producer 
decision making, which, when combined with a market clearing condition, define 
the market equilibrium.  For simplicity, we consider energy and emissions 
trading only for a single hour, and all entities behave competitively (i.e., do not 
exercise market power).  Transmission is disregarded, as are imports.6  
 
We start with the LSE model.  A single LSE serving all consumers is assumed; this 
model is readily generalized to multiple LSEs who can trade emissions 
allowances (as described in Gillenwater and Breidenich, 2009), and the 
fundamental results do not change.  LSEs are assumed to obtain power on behalf 
of consumers by contracting bilaterally with producers; a spot-market could also 
be included, but would complicate the analysis without providing additional 
                                                 
6In actual trading systems, emissions are usually accounted for on an annual basis, often with banking 
allowed between years, while energy markets have to balance in every hour.  Modeling analyses can account 
for how emissions may thereby shift among hours, and for how the price of emissions can evolve 
stochastically over the year in response to, e.g., unanticipated energy supply and demand changes.   
Including multiple hours in the examples would complicate the analysis, but not alter the conclusions   
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insight.  Here, LSEs are assumed to be regulated so that they minimize costs of 
meeting demand (as is the case with the utilities in California); a model based 
upon the alternative assumption of competition among profit maximizing LSEs 
could instead be formulated, but would not change our fundamental results.  
Consistent with the definition of load-based trading, the LSE model includes an 
upper bound upon the quantity-weighted emissions of the LSE’s energy 
portfolio.  Consumer demand for energy is assumed to be perfectly inelastic.  The 
notation of the LSE model is given below; throughout this paper, lower case 
letters represent variables, while upper case letters are fixed parameters.   
 
xLi = MW purchased by the LSE from producer i in the basic load-based 
system 
 
pLi = $/MWh price paid for power from producer i in the load-based 
system.  Consistent with the competitive assumption, prices are 
viewed by the LSE as being exogenous, but in actuality are 
endogenous to the market as a whole.  In general, these prices might 
differ among i because consumers will be willing to pay more for 
power from cleaner producers. 
 
Ei =  ton/MWh emissions rate for producer i  
L =  MW load for the LSE  
K =  tons/MWh emission cap for load; for instance, 0.5 might be chosen 
since it approximates the emissions rate of reasonably efficient gas-
fired generators. 
 
The LSE chooses which producers to buy power from in order to minimize the 
cost of meeting two constraints: the consumers’ demand for power and the 
emissions constraint: 
 
 MIN  ExpendituresL = Σi pLi xLi     (1a) 
          {xLi} 
       
    subject to:  –Σi Ei xLi  ≥ –K L    (shadow price αL)   (1b) 
   
Σi xLi  = L    (shadow price βL)     (1c) 
 
  xLi  ≥ 0   ∀i       (1d) 
The emissions constraint is expressed as a ≥ inequality so that the shadow price 
will be positive, since the shadow price is defined as the marginal change in the 
objective with respect to an increase in the constraint right-hand side.   
 
Turning to producers, we assume one plant per producer, with a constant 
marginal cost and a fixed capacity.   Each producer is a price taker.   The needed 
notation is: 
yLi = MW sales from producer i to LSE in the basic load-based system 
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Ci = $/MWh marginal cost of production for producer i 
CAPi = MW generation capacity for producer i 
The producer’s problem is to maximize net revenues subject to the capacity 
constraint: 
 
 MAX  ProfitLi = (pLi – Ci)yLi    (2a) 
          {yLi} 
 
    subject to:   0 ≤ yLi  ≤ CAPi    (shadow price μLi),  ∀ i   (2b) 
Of course, this simplistic representation disregards time varying prices and 
loads, unit commitment constraints, and other complications, but their absence 
does not affect our fundamental results. 
 
An equilibrium is achieved when each market party (LSE and producers) is 
optimizing their objective subject to the market prices, and markets clear.  
Mathematically, this is accomplished by forming an equilibrium model from the 
first-order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for each party’s optimization problem 
together with the clearing condition that demand equals supply for each 
producer: 
 xLi = yLi    (price pLi), ∀i      (3) 
This general approach to constructing equilibrium models is commonly used to 
simulate power and other commodity markets (e.g., Hobbs & Helman, 2004; 
Gabriel & Smeers, 2006).  We define separate market clearing constraints for 
each producer, rather than one for the entire market, because consumers need to 
account for emissions from their power contracts.  If properly formulated, the 
resulting model is a “square” system (as many conditions as unknowns) that can 
be solved for the unknowns {xLi, yLi ,pLi, αL, βL, μLi}.   The full model is presented in 
Appendix A.1.     
 
In Appendix A.1 we show that, in equilibrium, cleaner producers get a premium 
for their power, representing its value to the LSE for meeting its emissions 
constraint.  In particular: 
pLi = pL0 – αL Ei , ∀i      (4) 
where pL0 is the price that a producer with zero emissions would receive. 
3.  Market Equilibrium Model for Source-Based Equilibrium with Auctioned 
Allowances 
Here we develop, for comparison purposes, a model of a source-based market in 
which allowances are auctioned, and the proceeds returned to consumers.  We 
call this Source-Based Model I, as source-based systems that distribute 
allowances in other ways will be compared with the CO2RC system in Section 7.  
Notation for this model is the same as for the load-based equilibrium, except that 
the subscript “SI” is substituted for “L” on all variables. 
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The model for LSEs acting on behalf of consumers omits the emissions constraint 
of the load-based model, but has an extra objective function term:   
 
 MIN  ExpendituresSI = Σi pSIi xSIi – αSI K L   (5a)  
          {xSIi} 
subject to:   Σi xSIi  = L    (shadow price βSI)                 (5b)  
   xSIi  ≥ 0,   ∀i     (5c) 
The second expenditure term consists of the proceeds of the allowance auction.  
Since the decision variable xSIi does not enter that term, the LSE views it as a 
constant.  Meanwhile, the producer model differs from the load-based version 
because producers now bear the expense of buying allowances from an 
auctioneer at price αSI: 
 
 MAX  ProfitSIi = (pSIi – Ci – αSIEi)ySIi       (6a)       
{ySIi} 
subject to:   0 ≤ ySIi  ≤ CAPi    (shadow price μSIi),  ∀i (6b) 
Market clearing conditions complete the equilibrium model.  In addition to the 
energy market, there is now a clearing condition for allowance trading that 
ensures that total emissions do not exceed a cap.  
 
 xSIi = ySIi   (price pSIi), ∀i     (7a) 
 Σi Ei ySIi  ≤  K L    (nonnegative price αSI)   (7b) 
Again, prices are allowed to differ among energy sources.  Meanwhile, the 
emissions price can be positive only if the emissions constraint binds.  For 
comparison’s sake, the total number of allowances is assumed to be the same as 
the maximum emissions KL under the load-based model of Section 2. 
 
The source-based equilibrium model consists of the first-order conditions for 
each of the market participants’ optimization problems together with the market 
clearing conditions, yielding a square system (see Appendix A.1).  The unknowns 
are {xSIi, ySIi ,pSIi, αSI, βSI, μSIi}.   Unlike the load-based case, it turns out that the 
energy prices pSIi paid to all producers i are equal (Appendix A.1). 
 
4.  Equivalence of the Basic Load-Based and Source-Based Models 
The following results for the relationship of the two models are demonstrated in 
Appendix A.1.   The first set of results concerns the relationship between the 
equilibrium values of the price and quantity variables of the load- and source-
based models: 
 
pLi = pSIi– αSI Ei ,   ∀i     
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{xLi , yLi , αL, βL, μLi} = {xSIi , ySIi , αSI, βSI, μSIi}  (9) 
That is, the load-based energy price for a particular producer i equals the source-
based price minus a penalty for i’s emissions.  The penalty is the $/ton shadow 
price of emissions (which is implicit in the LSE’s maximization problem) times 
the ton/MWh emissions rate.  All other variables for the load- and source-based 
equilibria are equal.   
 
The second set of results establishes the equivalence of the two systems in terms 
of consumer payments and producer profits, if allowances are auctioned to 
producers and the proceeds are returned to consumers.  Thus, the “Rents to 
Clean Generation” that producers earn in the source-based system are also 
retained by producers in the load-based system.  The conclusion of Synapse 
Energy (2007) that consumers would gain those rents under the load-based 
system is incorrect. 
 
We illustrate this equivalence with a numerical example.  Consider a power 
system in which there is one LSE and three producers each with different types 
of generation (A, B, and C).    
 
• The load serving entity has constant load L  = 2000 MW.  Under the load-
based system, it is obliged to buy power contracts that, on average, have 
an emissions rate of K = 0.55 tons/MWh, so total emissions will be 1100 
tons (0.55*2000).  
• Generation type A (wind or hydro) has emissions EA of 0 tons/MWh, 
marginal cost CA = 0$/MWh, and capacity CAPA = 500 MW. 
• Generation type B (natural gas) emits EB = 0.6 tons/MWh, incurs cost CB = 
80$/MWh, and has ample capacity CAPB (no limit). 
• Generation type C (coal) has emissions EC of 1 ton/MWh, cost CC = 
40$/MWh, and ample capacity CAPC (no limit).7 
The solution to Section 2’s load-based model yields the following generation, 
cost, and prices: 
 
• MW generation yLi from companies i=A,B,C: yLA = 500 MW, yLB = 1000 MW, 
yLC = 500 MW.  These also equal the MW purchases by the LSE (xLA, xLB, 
and xLC, respectively). 
• Prices pLi paid by the LSE for each type of generation i=A,B,C: pLA = 
$140/MWh; pLB = $80/MWh; pLC = $40/MWh. 
• The total paid for power by the LSE is $170,000, or $85/MWh. 
• Only producer A makes a profit ($140/MWh*500 MW, or $70,000). 
                                                 
7 More elaborate assumptions about capacity limits on all units and dispatch over multiple hours of the 
year would not alter the fundamental conclusions of this analysis, but could of course change the specific 
numerical results.   A binding capacity constraint for natural gas generation in a given hour would mean, in 
this more general case, that an emissions constraint would either force more natural gas generation in other 
hours (those with lower demand) when that constraint is not binding, or additional clean generation from 
other even more costly sources, if available.  But in the simple single hour example of this section, if the 
capacity of the gas plant (B) was less than 1000 MW, then there would be no feasible solution – there is no 
dispatch that would result in the emissions limit being satisfied, as the solution involving both clean units 
(A and B) producing at capacity, displacing as much coal generation as possible, would still have higher 
emissions than the cap. 
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Thus, cleaner generation earns a premium in this market which results from the 
value it provides by making it easier for the LSE to achieve its emissions target.  
That is, an LSE is willing to pay more for cleaner power.  As we show above, it 
turns out that the “shadow price” of the LSE’s emissions constraint—$100/ton—
equals the price of emissions allowances in the source-based example, below.  
 
Now consider the source-based system of Section 3 with the same cap of 1100 
tons, with allowances being auctioned and the proceeds going to consumers.  The 
following is the equilibrium: 
 
• MW generation ySIi from companies i=A,B,C: ySIA = 500 MW, ySIB = 1000 
MW, ySIC = 500 MW.  These also equal MW purchases by the LSE (xSIA, xSIB, 
and xSIC, respectively). 
• The price for power is $140/MWh, and is the same for all producers.   
• The allowance price is $100/ton, so the allowances rent is $110,000.  This 
price means that the net marginal cost for B’s output is $140/MWh 
(=$80/MWh for fuel + 0.6 ton/MWh *$100/ton for allowances), which is 
the same as for C (=$40/MWh for fuel + 1.0 ton/MWh *$100/ton).  
Neither B nor C earns any operating profit, as price equals their marginal 
cost.  
• On the other hand, A’s marginal cost is $0, as it has neither fuel costs nor 
emissions; therefore, it will produce at its 500 MW capacity, and earn 
$70,000 in profits ($140/MWh*500 MW).   
• The LSE pays $280,000 for its power ($140/MWh*2000 MW).  But since 
consumers get the proceeds of the allowances auction, they accrue the 
allowances rent ($110,000), so the net cost to the consumers is $170,000 
or $85/MWh. 
Thus, the two systems (load-based and source-based/consumer-owned 
allowances) result in the same cost to load.  The “Rent to Clean Generation” in 
both cases accrues to Producer A (the cleanest generator).   Producer A earns 
this rent in the source-based case because it earns the full power price without 
having to pay for any allowances.  It earns the same rent in the load-based case 
because LSEs are willing to pay a premium for its power relative to higher-
emissions sources.  
 
5.  Impact on LSE Incentives for Energy Efficiency 
It has been argued that a load-based system will result in a greater incentive for 
LSE investments in energy efficiency technology than a source-based system 
(Bluemel, 2009).  The argument is that LSEs have more options than generators 
for reducing the need for allowances and that the load-based system “paints a 
target on the back” of the LSE, making it more accountable for its carbon 
footprint.  However, there are two reasons why the incentives for demand-side 
programs under the basic load-based system would not differ from those under 
source-based systems, at least in California. 
 
The first reason is that California’s LSEs are already required to account for and 
report the GHG emissions associated with their contracts no matter what sort of 
GHG regulatory system is implemented under AB 32.  There will be public 
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visibility and pressure to pursue energy efficiency to lower emissions under 
either load-based or source-based systems. 
 
The second reason is that California investor-owned utilities are subject to an 
extensive regulatory system that arguably provides more incentives than any 
other state for investment in energy efficiency.  These incentives include 
procurement priorities that place efficiency at the top of the list among all 
resources; a charge paid by all California electricity consumers to fund cost-
effective energy efficiency programs; the decoupling of utility revenues from 
sales; and rate-of-return incentives adopted by the CPUC in September 2007.  
With implementation of AB 32, carbon costs will be included as part of the 
“avoided energy costs” in the “Total Resource Cost Test” used to identify 
beneficial efficiency programs under California’s rules; as a result, more energy 
efficiency programs will become cost-effective.  This will be true under either 
load- or source-based programs.  California’s strong regulatory incentives will 
then motivate utilities to pursue many, if not most, of those opportunities. 
 
In particular, the avoided cost of energy will be the same in the simple load- and 
source-based programs of Sections 2 and 3.  The above numerical example 
illustrates this.  Under the California “Standard Practice” for benefit-cost analysis 
of demand-side programs (CPUC, 2001), “utility avoided costs” quantify the 
utility’s energy cost savings resulting from changes in load.  Assuming that 
implementation of energy efficiency programs would not change the total 
emissions cap of 1100 tons in our example, the only impact of energy efficiency 
upon the LSE’s optimization problem is that a unit decrease in load L lowers the 
right-hand side of the LSE’s load constraint by 1 MWh.  The shadow price for that 
constraint, βL = $140/MWh, indicates the amount that the LSE’s objective would 
thereby decrease.  This is the avoided cost, which is the change in LSE 
expenditures, given that the total emission tonnage constraint is unchanged.  
This value is the same as the price of emissions-free power (pLA = $140/MWh).  
Meanwhile, in the source-based model of Section 3, a unit decrease in L again 
decreases the right-hand side of the LSE’s load constraint by 1 unit.  Since that 
constraint’s shadow price is βSI = $140/MWh (the same as the market price of 
power), the cost-savings to the LSE is the same as in the load-based model.   
 
Thus, “utility avoided cost” is the same under the load-based and source-based 
models (βL =βSI).  As it is this cost that is compared to the expense of energy 
efficiency, an LSE has no more economic incentive to pursue efficiency under the 
load-based system than under the source-based system.    
 
6.  Analysis of the Generation Emissions Attribute Certificate Load-Based 
Proposal  
 
6.1   Model 
 
The GEAC load-based system proposed by Gillenwater and Breidenich (2009) 
unbundles emissions and energy so that power markets, such as the CAISO, 
would not have to track emissions associated with generators.  The proposal has 
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the producer unbundle the GHG emissions rate from power production; then the 
producer can sell the GHG rights to load, and power to whomever it wants.  The 
rights are called GEACs, have units of energy (MWh), and have the additional 
attribute of the actual emissions rate (tons/MWh) of the generator.  Thus, GEACs 
are a differentiated commodity.  Each load-serving entity (LSE) is responsible for 
buying enough MWh of GEACs to meet its load, and the total emissions 
associated with the GEACs it buys (the sum of the weighted product of the GEACs 
and their associated emissions) must be no more than the LSE’s emissions limit.    
 
The idea of the GEAC proposal is captured in the following market equilibrium 
model, consisting of a LSE model, a producer model, and clearing conditions.  The 
subscript G on the variables indicates that they are GEAC market equilibrium 
values.  Two sets of prices that clear the market: pGi (the $/MWh price of power 
from producer i) and πGi (the $/MWh price of GEACs from i). 
 
We start with the LSE’s optimization problem.  Choose (1) the amount of 
electricity xGi to buy from each producer i and (2) the amount of GEACs uGi to 
purchase from each producer i in order to minimize the cost of meeting demand, 
subject to regulatory constraints concerning the amount and mix of GEACs that 
each LSE has to buy. 
 
MIN  ExpendituresG =  Σi pGi xGi + Σi πGi uGi              (10a) 
         {xGi ,uGi} 
   subject to: Σi xGi = L  (shadow price βG)  (10b) 
Σi uGi  – Σi xGi = 0       (shadow price γG)  (10c) 
Σi (T-Ei)uGi > (T–K) L   (shadow price αG) (10d) 
xiG, uGi > 0 ,    ∀i     (10e) 
The notation is the same as in the previous sections, with three exceptions: the 
addition of a new constant T, a new decision variable uGi, and its price πGi.   T is a 
default emissions rate per MWh set by the regulator.  This can be the target rate 
K or a higher rate; for instance, Gillenwater and Breidenich (2009) propose a T 
equal to the highest rate among all plants in the market.  The new variable uGi, is 
the MWh of GEACs that the LSE buys from producer i.  Its price πGi will, in 
general, vary among producers i, because different emissions rates are 
associated with GEACs from different sources.  
 
Meanwhile, the second and third constraints are new. The second one says that 
the number of GEACs has to equal the amount of energy consumed.  The third 
constraint is equivalent to the basic load-based constraint (1b) that says that the 
emissions-weighted energy purchases cannot exceed the target emissions.  
However, because of the way that GEACs are defined, we express it differently 
(but equivalently) to help derive the equilibrium GEAC prices.  In particular, the 
sum of the GEACs, weighted by their emissions rate reduction relative to the 
default rate (T–Ei), must be at least equal to the load times (T–K), the emissions 
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reduction implied by the target emissions rate K relative to the default rate T.  
Some algebra shows that (10d) is equivalent to (1b). This is done by rearranging 
the terms in (10d), and then substituting in (10b) and (10c) as follows: 
 
T Σi uGi –Σi Ei uGi > T L –K L   
T Σi xGi –Σi Ei uGi > T Σi xGi  –K L   
–Σi Ei uGi >  –K L     (11) 
 
The last expression is the simple load-based constraint (1b) on LSE emissions. 
 
Considering now the producer problem, each i has to choose the amount 
of generation yGi  [MWh] and GEACs vGi to sell in order to maximize profit. 
 
MAX     Profit = (pGi – Cj)yGi  + πGi vGi            (12a) 
          {yGi , vGi } 
subject to:     yGi  – vGi  = 0 (shadow price θGi),  ∀i (12b) 
0 ≤ yGi  ≤ CAPi    (shadow price μGi),  ∀i  (12c) 
There are two market clearing conditions.  First, for energy from each producer:   
 
  xGi = yGi  (price pGi), ∀i       (13a)   
Second, the amount of GEACs bought from each producer has to equal the 
amount it produces.  
 
                         uGi = vGi   (price πGi),   ∀i    (13b) 
As with the other models, the market equilibrium can now be defined by 
combining these clearing conditions with the first-order conditions of the 
consumer and producer models (as in Appendix A.2). 
 
Gillenwater and Breidenich (2009) (e.g., Figure 2) suggest that GEACs from 
producer i would fetch a market price πGi proportional to (T – Ei).   Appendix A.2 
shows that this is indeed a market equilibrium and that the constant of 
proportionality is then αG, the market price/ton of emissions; i.e.,  
 
πGi =  αG (T – Ei),      ∀i    (14) 
The relative size of the default and plant emissions rates determines the plant’s 
GEAC price, which can be negative.  A plant that is cleaner than the default (T > 
Ei) gets paid for credits (πGi > 0), while if it is dirtier than the default (T < Ei), it 
has to pay consumers to take the credits off its hands (πGi < 0).  The logic is that 
LSEs should be willing to pay a premium for a certificate that makes it easier to 
comply with its emissions constraint (e.g., a GEAC whose Ei < K), while a LSE 
would have to be bribed to accept a certificate that makes it more difficult to 
comply with that constraint (i.e., a GEAC with a very high Ei).  Thus, low emission 
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producers would be paid handsomely for their GEACs, while a coal plant might 
have to pay LSEs to take the GEACs off its hands, depending where T is pegged. 
(This presupposes a regulatory system that requires producers to get rid of all 
their GEACs, and an effective enforcement system.) If, as Gillenwater and 
Breidenich (2009) propose, T is set at a very high level, then coal plants may get 
instead get a small positive or zero price, depending on their emissions rate.   
 
The choice of target T can affect the price of GEACs; it also affects the price of 
power.  However, in a closed power market in which load L is fixed, in 
equilibrium, it turns out that total profit for each producer is unaffected (see 
Appendix A.2).  Although increasing T would increase GEAC prices (and thus 
producer revenues), power prices decrease by an identical amount.  The same 
generation and consumption solution and consumer costs result for all values of 
T.   
 
The value of T also affects the net payments from consumers to producers 
through the GEAC mechnism.   Having a higher default emissions rate (T > K) 
would result in payments, on net, from LSEs to producers, although power prices 
would be lower in compensation.   Setting T = K instead results in zero net 
payments for GEACs by LSEs, and even smaller values of T would mean that 
producers instead pay LSEs, on average.  Since consumer costs, including power 
costs, are the same in each case, setting T = K (yielding pricing rule πGi = αG(K–
Ei)) is arguably the easiest to administer.  This is because LSEs would pay 
nothing on net to producers—in fact, they would not need to be involved in the 
system at all, as the GEAC system reduces to source-based trading, as shown 
below.  
 
As a numerical example of the GEAC system with T = K, consider an LSE with a 
load of L = 1 MWh.  Two producers can serve that load: A, which has high 
emissions (EA = 1 ton CO2/MWh) and B, which has low emissions (EB = 0.5 
ton/MWh).  The default and target emissions rates are equal, T = K = 0.75 
tons/MWh.  A’s marginal generation cost is $40/MWh, and B’s is $70/MWh.  The 
equilibrium energy price is pGA = pGB = $55/MWh, so there is only one electricity 
price and the ISO does not have to track different "flavors" of electricity.  
Meanwhile, the price of emissions is αG = $60/ton.  Consequently, dirty producer 
A has to bribe the LSE $15/MWh to take its credits, while clean producer B gets 
paid the same amount for its GEACs.  Neither producer earns any profit. 
 
Interestingly, the LSE pays nothing on net for its GEACs. In particular, it pays 
$60*(0.75-0.5) = $15/MWh for 0.5 GEACs from producer B, but is paid $60*(1-
0.75) = $15/MWh for the 0.5 GEACs it accepts from producer A.  As noted above, 
this is no coincidence; each LSE pays $0 for its GEACs if the target T is set equal 
to K and if dirty producers (Ei > K) are forced to pay LSEs to take their GEACs.   So 
there is no point in having LSEs participate in the GEAC market if T = K; it turns 
out that an equivalent source-based system can be devised that only involves 
producers.  
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6.2 Equivalence of GEAC to a Source-Based System with Free Allocation of 
Allowances to Producers   
Assume that T = K, and dirty producers must pay LSEs to take their GEACs.  The 
resulting GEAC model simplifies if it is recognized that the assumed pricing rule 
will result in the consumer’s emissions constraint being binding in an optimal 
solution.   We can then combine the emissions constraint (10d) and the LSE’s 
demand constraint (10b), yielding:   
 
 Σi Ei uGi = K L  = K Σi xGi  = K Σi uGi     (15) 
which implies that the objective function term (Σi πGi uGi = Σi αG (K – Ei)uGi) is 
identically zero.  This means that each LSE pays nothing, on net, for its GEACs.   
Thus, there is no need to have load participate in this market.  The complications 
of having not only to monitor plant emissions but also track sales of GEACs to 
LSEs serve no purpose and can be avoided.   As shown in Appendix A.2, this 
nominally load-based trading system is actually a source-based system with the 
following properties: 
 
1. An elastic emissions cap that is proportional to the target emissions rate K 
times total production (here, L).   So if demand, and thus production, 
grows, so do emissions. 
2. Free allocation of allowances to producers in proportion to their sales, 
rather than an auction.  
 
The free allocation of allowances in proportion to sales implicitly subsidizes 
marginal production compared to a system in which allowances are auctioned or 
even given away free according to some grandfathering rule that is independent 
of present output decisions.  However, because distributing allowances in 
proportion to generator sales lowers generator marginal costs, energy prices 
decrease (Fischer, 2003); in this simple model, the allowances rent in the GEAC 
system is entirely returned to consumers in the form of lower energy prices. 
  
What if a more general default emissions rate of T is used, so that the pricing rule 
is πGi = αG(T – Ei)? If the equilibrium emissions price αG and pattern of GEAC 
purchases were unchanged (which would be the case here, see the Appendix), 
the increase in LSE payments due to increasing the default rate to T from K 
would be the change in the last term of the LSE’s objective:   
 
αG[Σi (T – Ei)uG i]  – αG[Σi (K – Ei)uG i] = αG(T –K)L 
That is, this would be equivalent to taxing the consumer by αG(T–K) per MWh; 
producers would receive a payment of this amount per MWh they generate 
(assuming no resistance losses, so generation equals load).  Thus, energy 
production by all producers would be subsidized.  So there is no theoretical 
reason to set up an elaborate load-based accounting system to implement a 
system with a default emission rate T≠K if all producers must participate.8  
                                                 
8 As Gillenwater and Breidenich (2009) point out, however, if participation by producers is voluntary (as 
might be in the case of importers of power from unregulated jurisdictions), then a higher default rate might 
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Instead, an energy tax can be imposed on consumption, and its proceeds passed 
to generators, or used for other purposes. 
 
Further, assuming L is fixed (perfectly inelastic), then in a competitive 
equilibrium, any tax payments by consumers that are given to producers would 
be returned to consumers in the form of lower power prices.  Nothing would 
then be accomplished—the net costs to consumers would be exactly the same 
(see Appendix A.2).  So there would be a reason to do this only if the taxes were 
used for some purpose other than a subsidy to producers.  
 
Continuing with the above example, if T = K = 0.75 tons/MWh, then, as pointed 
out earlier, the equilibrium energy price is $55/MWh (whether in the GEAC 
system or its equivalent source-based system).  The LSE bears only the price of 
energy, and the payments it receives for accepting dirty GEACs exactly offsets its 
payments for clean GEACs.   But if instead T is set to the emissions rate of the 
dirtiest unit (here, 1 ton/MWh), the LSE has to pay for all their GEACs, but the 
equilibrium price of power falls in compensation.  In particular, the LSE buys 0.5 
GEACs from dirty producer A for αG(T–EA)uGA = $60(1-1)0.5 = $0, and 0.5 GEACs 
from clean producer B for αG(T–EB)uGB = $60(1-0.5)0.5 = $15 total.   The 
equilibrium power price however is $40/MWh, so the LSE will spend a total of 
$55 for its 1 MWh of load—the same as in the T = K case. 
To sum up, the GEAC proposal has been shown to be equivalent to a version of 
source-based trading in which allowances are distributed free to generators in 
proportion to their sales.  If the default emissions rate used to define GEACs is 
higher than the targeted rate, then, in effect, consumers are taxed to subsidize 
production (by paying more for emissions reductions by producers), although in 
equilibrium this tax is returned to consumers in the form of lower power prices.  
 
7.  Analysis of the CO2RC Load-Based Proposal 
 
7.1 Model   
Like the GEAC proposal, the CO2RC variant of load-based trading unbundles 
emissions and energy.  Thus, LSEs do not track emissions associated with 
individual power sales, which is more compatible with CAISO-type spot markets 
than the basic load-based proposals.  To explore the properties of the CO2RC 
proposal, we first develop a model of the price and emissions market equilibrium 
under an alternative source-based system, and then show it is equivalent to 
CO2RC.  
 
Consider the following somewhat peculiar source-based system, which we label 
Source-Based System II.  It is the same as Section 3’s source-based system with 
two exceptions:   
 
1. Each producer i is granted TySIIi allowances per year for free, where, T is a 
high “default” emissions rate (e.g., 1 ton/MWh) that is larger than K, the 
                                                                                                                                            
be preferred in order to incent participation.   However, the payments from consumers to producers would 
then be even greater. 
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target per-MWh emissions rate.  Thus, if a generator sells more power, it 
gets more allowances, unlike Source-Based System I.   Since energy supply 
equals demand (disregarding imports and resistance losses), this means 
that a total of TL allowances are distributed to generators, well in excess 
of the desired cap. 
2. Because there would otherwise be too many allowances relative to the 
cap, the LSE is required to buy back and retire (T-K)L tons/yr of emissions 
allowances from the market.     
 
The second feature is the peculiar aspect of this CO2 trading system, in that in 
normal source-based systems (e.g., the EU ETS), LSEs do not have to buy 
allowances.   
 
We model this system by developing models of market party behavior, and 
imposing market clearing to calculate an equilibrium.   The LSE minimizes the 
cost of buying power and allowances:  
 
 MIN ExpendituresSII = Σi pSIIi xSIIi  + αSII (T-K)L           (16a) 
{xSIIi} 
  subject to: Σi xSIIi  = L    (shadow price βSII)   (16b) 
  xSIIi   ≥  0 ,    ∀i      (16c) 
The subscript SII indicates that these are the equilibrium values for Source-
Based System II.  Now, the producer chooses generation ySIIi to maximize profit 
(equaling energy revenue minus production and emissions costs, plus the value 
of the free allowances it is allocated), subject to a capacity constraint:    
 
MAX   Profit = (pSIIi – Ci – αSIIEi)ySIIi + αSIITySIIi           (17a) 
{ySIIi} 
       subject to: 0 ≤ ySIIi ≤ CAPi      (shadow price μSIIi),  ∀i  (17b) 
There are two market clearing conditions in Source-Based System II.   One is that 
sales equals generation for each i, as before:  
 
xSIIi = ySIIi    (price pSIIi),   ∀i        (18a) 
The other is the market clearing condition for emissions allowances, which is 
that consumer allowance purchases plus generator emissions do not exceed the 
allowances allocated to generators:  
 
(T-K)L  + Σi Ei ySIIi  ≤ TL  (nonnegative price αSII)  (18b) 
When rearranged, this is the same as total emissions not exceeding the target KL, 
as it must:  
 
 Σi EiySIIi  ≤ KL    (nonnegative price αSII)   (18b′) 
 18 
Once again, gathering the first-order conditions for optimality for the producers 
and the LSE together with the market clearing conditions allows us to solve for 
the variables {xSIIi , ySIIi , pSIIi , αSII} as well as for the shadow prices for the 
producers’ and LSE’s constraints.  As in the case of Section 3’s source-based 
system, it can be shown that the energy price received by all producers that 
generate a positive amount of energy is the same (pSIIi = pSIIj for all i and j that sell 
power) (Appendix A.3). 
 
Now, this Source-Based System II trading can be shown to be economically 
equivalent to the proposed CO2RC system as follows.   Under the CO2RC proposal: 
 
• Each producer i sells CO2RC’s equal to (T-Ei)yIIi tons, receiving price αSII 
for each ton.  This results in exactly the same profit function (17a) as in 
Source-Based System II. 
• The LSE buys CO2RC’s equal to (T-K)L, paying price αSII for each ton.  This 
results in exactly the same LSE expenditure (16a) as in Source-Based 
System II. 
 
Consequently, it follows that the same exact market equilibrium {xSIIi, ySIIi, pSIIi, 
αSII}, profit, and consumer costs will result in this CO2RC system as in Source-
Based System II.   There are a couple of notable characteristics of the equilibrium 
for this unusual source-based system:  
 
• The producers obtain allowance rents because they are given allowances 
free; but because allowances are allocated in proportion to sales, this 
decreases the opportunity cost of production.  Consequently, electricity 
prices decrease, a general characteristic of source-based systems in which 
allowance allocations are tied to output (Fischer, 2003).  Here, the price 
decrease results in returning every last penny of the allowance rents to 
consumers.  (This is proven in Appendix A.3 by mathematically 
comparing the market equilibrium for this source-based system with the 
equilibrium for Source-Based System I in which allowances are auctioned 
to producers, Section 3). 
• There is extra bookkeeping compared to a more typical source-based 
system, because the LSEs must also participate in the allowances market.  
 
The following additional results can also be proven mathematically (see 
Appendix A.3).  We now compare the CO2RC system to a third source-based 
system where the LSE does not have to buy allowances, and allowances are 
allocated freely to generators at rate Kyi (rather than the higher Tyi, the rate that 
is implicit in the CO2RC system).   LSEs do not have to buy allowances back from 
producers in this system, which we call Source-Based System III.  
 
• CO2RC and the Source-Based Systems I, II, and III all have the same price 
of allowances α as well as the same pattern of generation x, sales y, and 
avoided cost of serving load β. 
• Producer profits are the same in all four of these systems, as are the total 
costs to LSEs/consumers (accounting for both energy and payments 
allowances). 
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• The price of power in the CO2RC system (and System II) is less by (T-K)α 
per MWh compared to Source-Based System III.  The lower revenue that 
producers earn under CO2RC/Source-Based System II is exactly made up 
by the extra allowance revenue resulting from producers being given 
more allowances (T tons per MWh of production under CO2RC/Source-
Based System II rather than the lower K tons per MWh under System III).   
This distortion in the price of power under CO2RC/System II could have 
significant implications for power trade with neighboring regions not 
subject to the allowances cap. 
• Both the CO2RC and Source-Based Systems II and III have lower power 
prices than Source-Based System I (Section 3) in which allowances are 
auctioned to producers.  However, if consumers are given the revenues 
from the auction, then the value that consumers obtain from the auction 
exactly makes up for the electricity price differences. 
 
Thus, the CO2RC system has no theoretical advantage over a pure source-based 
system.  But it has the disadvantage of more administrative complexity by 
unnecessarily involving LSEs in allowance markets.  
 
7.2 Numerical Example 
We return to the two producer example of Section 6.2 in which load is 1 MWh.  
The default emissions rate T = 1 ton/MWh, and the target emissions rate is 0.75 
tons.  We compare the CO2RC and three source-based systems:  
 
• Source-Based System I.  Allowances are auctioned to producers, and the 
consumers receive the revenues from the auction (=αSIKL = αSI0.75).  
• Source-Based System II (identical to CO2RC).   Allowances are freely 
allocated to producers at rate TySIIi (=1ySIIi), and the LSE must buy (T-K)L 
(=(1-0.75)*1 = 0.25) allowances back from the producers.   
• Source-Based System III.   Allowances are freely allocated to producers at 
rate KySIIIi (=0.75ySIIIi), resulting in a total of KL = 0.75 allowances being 
allocated.   
 
In all three source-based systems, each producer i consumes Ei yi allowances. 
 
In equilibrium, all four systems have the same output, allowances price, profits, 
and LSE cost: 
 
• Each of the two producers generates 0.5 MWh. 
• The allowance price α = $60/ton. 
• Each generator earns no profit.  (In general, capacity constraints would 
result in nonzero profits for some generators, as in Section 4, but their 
profits would be the same under all systems.) 
• Consumer cost is $55/year (energy plus any costs or proceeds from 
allowances). 
 
However, the energy prices differ:  
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• For a given system, the price of power is the same for all producers (pA = 
pB); however this uniform price is differs among the four systems.   
• The CO2RC system and its equivalent source-based system (System II) 
have the same p = $40/MWh.  Producer A’s profit is (p – Ci – αEi)yi + αTyi = 
(40-40-60*1)0.5 + 60*1*0.5 = 0.  For B, (p – Ci – αEi)yi + αTyi = (40-70-
60*0.5)0.5 + 60*1*0.5 = 0.   Note that the power price ($40) is less than 
the clean plant B’s marginal fuel cost ($70), but B still breaks even 
because it is given more allowances than it consumes.  The LSE pays only 
$40*1 = $40 for its energy, but is also must buy back 0.25 allowances 
@$60/ton, making its total cost $55/yr. 
• Source-Based System III has a higher power price (p = $55/MWh).   
However, the generators still earn zero profit, because they are given 
fewer allowances (0.75 tons per MWh sold rather than 1 ton).  The LSE’s 
total cost is just the energy cost, $55*1 = $55/yr, as it neither buys 
allowances nor receives allowance auction revenues in this system. 
• Source-Based System I has a still higher power price, p=$100/MWh (also 
the price under the basic load-based system in Section 2).  This is because 
the price of power reflects the full opportunity cost of allowances, and is 
not distorted by an allowance allocation that gives free allowances in 
proportion to energy sales.  Profits are still zero, even though the plants’ 
fuel cost is less than p; this is because producers now have to buy all their 
allowances.  Although the LSE pays $100*1 = $100/yr for energy, it 
receives the proceeds of the allowance auction, which equal $60/ton* 
0.75 tons/yr = $45/yr.  As a result, the net cost to load is, like all the above 
systems, $55/yr. 
 
In summary, under these simple assumptions, the CO2RC system has the same 
consumer costs and generator profits as source-based systems.  The most 
relevant of these assumptions include no market power, perfectly inelastic 
demand,9 and an emissions trading system that involves all generators.  The 
price of power is the same under the CO2RC system and a source-based system in 
which generators receive Tyi free allowances, where T is the “dirty” or other high 
benchmark emissions rate, and LSEs are required to buy back and retire 
allowances so that total emissions meets the target.  But the CO2RC system is 
administratively more complex while lacking any obvious advantages compared 
to simpler source-based systems that do not require consumers to buy 
allowances (Systems I and III). 
                                                 
9 In general, for any of these proposals, an analysis of the case of elastic demand would require that 
additional assumptions be made about how side payments from consumers to producers (e.g., to buy back 
excess allowances in the CO2RC case) or to consumers from producers (e.g., revenues from allowance 
auctions in the source-based case) are translated into consumer rates.  Development of models based on 
such assumptions, and the analysis of their implications for the level and timing of consumer demand and 
system costs, would be of interest in future research, but are out of the scope of this paper.   The fact that 
consumer costs under all systems are the same under inelastic demand (given allowance auctions in source-
based systems) suggests that it may be possible to define retail rate structures for all of the proposals that 
would yield the same retail prices for consumers and thus the same quantities demanded.  Indeed, this is 
the conclusion of Chen et al. (2008a)’s comparison of source-based and the pure load-based proposal 
under elastic demand.  On the other hand, if proceeds from allowance auctions were refunded to 
consumers via adjustments in, say, income taxes, then source-based systems could have higher electricity 
prices than the other systems, with consequent implications for power consumption and allocative 
efficiency. 
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8. Conclusion 
If it is decided that regulation of the GHG emissions of the California power 
sector should proceed immediately under AB 32 and the Western Climate 
Initiative, we recommend that a first-seller system based on source-based 
trading be implemented, rather than a load-based system.  We conclude that a 
load-based system, rather than lowering energy costs to Californian consumers 
relative to a source-based system, would likely result in higher costs.  As our 
analyses have shown, at best, the load-based system is no less expensive to 
consumers than the source-based approach, if both result in efficient dispatch 
and if emission allowance rents (in the form of proceeds from emissions 
allowance auctions) are allocated to LSEs.  Contrary to previous assertions, the 
economic rents that clean power plants earn because electricity prices rise 
remain in the hands of those producers under load-based trading, just like 
source-based systems.  However, the basic load-based approach poses significant 
risk to dispatch efficiency by discouraging cleaner sources from submitting bids 
to the California ISO’s day-ahead and real-time markets, thereby decreasing the 
flexibility and competitiveness of those markets.  In contrast, a source-based 
system utilizes those markets to help achieve the GHG policy objectives more 
effectively and efficiently. 
   
The speculative benefits of a load-based system, in terms of possibly greater 
incentives for energy efficiency programs, cannot be justified in light of the 
additional administrative complexity and cost of such a system, the threat that it 
would pose to the competitiveness and efficiency of the electricity spot markets, 
and the additional difficulties that would arise when transition to a federal cap-
and-trade system would occur.  Indeed, we show that a basic load-based 
program would not provide greater incentives for efficiency programs, because 
the total avoided cost of power (as used in benefit-cost tests for energy 
efficiency) is the same for the load- and source-based system. 
  
These conclusions are also applicable to personal carbon allowance systems.  
With cost-minimizing consumers and profit-maximizing producers, our models 
imply that such systems are likely to be economically equivalent to a carbon tax 
or source-based trading.  However, an argument in favor of PCAs is that when 
consumers consume more than the cost-minimizing amount of energy due to 
ignorance or other reasons (i.e., X-inefficiency), PCAs would raise the saliency of 
energy expenditures and thus encourage conservation. However, the huge 
administrative costs associated with PCAs (House of Commons, 2008) could only 
be justified if they motivate consumers to undertake large amounts of carbon 
reductions whose cost is below the market price of allowances, but would 
otherwise not be undertaken even with the economic incentive of price rises due 
to source-based allowances.  The equity advantages of PCAs can also be attained 
by source-based systems by adjusting the tax system to return the proceeds of 
allowance auctions to consumers. 
 
The GEAC and CO2RC systems have been proposed as modified load-based 
approaches that have the advantage of allowing energy spot markets to operate 
as presently.  Those proposals do this by unbundling emissions and energy at the 
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source, and requiring load-serving entities to buy both separately.  However, we 
have demonstrated that under some simple assumptions, they can both be 
viewed as source-based trading systems with some unusual (and undesirable) 
features and additional administrative costs.  In the case where the “default” 
emissions rate in GEAC is higher than the target emissions rate for LSEs and 
price elasticity is zero, GEAC is equivalent to a source-based system where not 
only are emissions allowances granted freely to producers, but also consumers 
pay a per MWh tax to subsidize energy production.  Additional transaction costs 
are incurred because consumers must track and purchase a differentiated 
commodity, GEACs.  Meanwhile, CO2RC essentially distributes an excess number 
of allowances freely to generators in proportion to their sales, and then requires 
LSEs to buy back some of those allowances.   Both systems are no cheaper to 
consumers than source-based trading with allowance auction proceeds returned 
to consumers.  Further, the involvement of LSEs in the CO2RC and GEAC systems 
introduces administrative complexities not present in most source-based cap-
and-trade programs.   
 
Thus, we believe that the California Public Utilities Commission has correctly 
chosen to recommend a first-seller approach to regulate power sector GHG 
emissions, combining a source-based approach for in-state resources and 
emissions accounting for imports in order to limit emissions leakage (CPUC, 
2008).  This proposal is compatible with federal proposals and, if expanded to 
the entire west, will result in an emissions trading system that is as or more 
efficient than load-based alternatives.    
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APPENDICES 
A.1.   Relationships of Load-Based System and Source-Based System I 
First order conditions for inequality constrained optimization problems often 
involve conditions of the form {x ≥ 0, f(X) ≥ 0, x f(X) = 0}, where x is a scalar 
variable and f(X) is a function of a vector of variables X.  Here, we write such 
conditions in the equivalent, more compact form {0≤ x ⊥ f(X) ≥ 0}, where “⊥” is 
the “perp” symbol.  
 
The equilibrium problem for the load-based market in Section 2 is to find {xLi, yLi 
,pLi, αL, βL, μLi} that solve the following set of conditions:   
 
 0 ≤ xLi ⊥ pLi  +  Ei αL – βL ≥ 0,      ∀i   (A1a) 
          0 ≤ αL ⊥ –Σi Ei xLi  + K L ≥ 0         (A1b) 
 Σi xLi  = L   (βL unrestricted)     (A1c) 
 0 ≤ yLi ⊥ pLi  – Ci – μLi ≤ 0, ∀i   (A1d) 
 0 ≤ μLi ⊥ yLi – CAPi ≤ 0, ∀i   (A1e) 
     xLi = yLi    (pLi unrestricted)  ∀i    (A1f) 
(A1a-c) and (A1d-e) are the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for optimization 
problems (1) and (2), respectively, and (A1f) is the market clearing condition (3).  
If there is a plant with zero emissions and strictly positive output (xLi = yLi  > 0), 
then (A1a) implies that its energy price (pL0) equals βL.  Further, (Ala) also 
implies that the price pLi for any generator i with positive output must equal pL0 –
Ei αL.    
 
Meanwhile, the equilibrium problem for Source-Based System I (Section 3) 
consists of solving for {xSIi, ySIi ,pSIi, αSI, βSI, μSIi}that satisfy the below equilibrium 
conditions.  
 
 0 ≤ xSIi ⊥ pSIi  – βSI  ≥ 0,      ∀i    (A2a) 
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          Σi xSIi  = L   (βSI unrestricted)    (A2b) 
 0 ≤ ySIi ⊥ pSIi  – Ci – αSI Ei  – μSIi ≤ 0, ∀i  (A2c) 
 0 ≤ μSIi ⊥ ySIi – CAPi ≤ 0, ∀i   (A2d) 
     xSIi = ySIi    (pSIi unrestricted),  ∀i   (A2e) 
0 ≤ αSI ⊥ –Σi Ei xSIi  + K L ≥ 0         (A2f) 
(A2a-b) and (A2c-d) are the LSE and producer first-order conditions, 
respectively, and (A2e-f) are the market clearing conditions.  By (A2a) and (A2e), 
all power plants whose sales ySIi are strictly positive have the same price (pSIi   = 
βSI  for all ySIi  > 0).   
  
To establish the equivalence of the equilibria defined by (A1a)-(A1f) and (A2a)-
(A2f), as asserted in Section 4, it is sufficient to note that a solution to one set of 
conditions also satisfies the other set, and vice versa.   In particular, if {xSIi, ySIi ,pSIi 
–Ei αSI, αSI, βSI, μSIi}is substituted for {xLi, yLi, pLi, αL, βL, μLi} in the load-based 
conditions (A1a)-(A1f), then the source-based equilibrium conditions (A2a)-
(A2f) result.  Going the other way, substituting {xLi, yLi ,pLi, αL, βL, μLi}for {xSIi, ySIi 
,pSIi –Ei αSI, αSI, βSI, μSIi} in the source-based conditions (A2a)-(A2f) yields the load-
based equilibrium conditions (A1a)-(A1f).  Thus, an equilibrium for one market 
is an equilibrium for the other if we note that the load-based energy price pLi is 
equivalent to the source-based price adjusted downwards by the cost of 
associated emissions allowances pSIi –Ei αSI.   Further, the avoided cost of energy 
for LSEs in the load-based market (the shadow price of the load constraint βL) is 
also an equilibrium avoided cost for the source-based market (βSI), as claimed in 
Section 5.   
  
That the producer profits and consumer costs are the same in the load- and 
source-based systems of Sections 2 and 3, respectively, can be established by 
substituting pSIi –Ei αSI and ySIi for their equivalents pLi and yLi, respectively, in the 
load-based profit expression (2a):  
 
 ProfitLi = (pLi – Ci)yLi =  (pSIi – αSIEi – Ci)ySIi   (A3) 
which equals ProfitSIi (3a).  Similarly, substituting pSIi–EiαSI and xSIi in place of pLi 
and xLi, respectively, in the load-based LSE cost expression (1a) yields:  
 
Σi pLi xLi = Σi (pSIi – αSIEi)xSIi    (A4) 
Rearranging, and assuming that (1b) holds as an equality Σi Ei xSIi = K L 
(otherwise, regulation would not lower GHG emissions): 
 
Σi (pSIi – αSIEi)xSIi = Σi pSIi xSIi – αSI Σi Ei xSIi = Σi pSIi xSIi – αSI K L (A5) 
which is ExpendituresSI (4a).  
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A.2   Relationships of GEAC and Source-Based Systems 
The equilibrium problem for the GEAC market in Section 6 is to find {xGi , uGi , yGi , 
vGi, pGi , πGi , αG, βG, γG , μGi , θGi }that solve the below market equilibrium 
conditions:   
 
 0 ≤ xGi ⊥ pGi  – βG + γG ≥ 0,      ∀i   (A6a) 
0 ≤ uGi ⊥ πGi  –γG  – (T–Ei )αG ≥ 0,      ∀i  (A6b)           
Σi xGi  = L   (βG unrestricted)     (A6c) 
Σi uGi  – Σi xGi = 0     (γG unrestricted)   (A6d) 
0 ≤ αG ⊥ Σi (T-Ei)uGi – (T–K) L ≥ 0        (A6e) 
 0 ≤ yGi ⊥ pGi  – Ci – θGi – μGi  ≤ 0,    ∀i   (A6f) 
 0 ≤ vGi ⊥ πGi +θGi ≤ 0, ∀i    (A6g) 
yGi  – vGi  = 0   (θGi unrestricted),  ∀i   (A6h) 
 0 ≤ μGi ⊥ yGi – CAPi ≤ 0, ∀i   (A6i) 
     xGi = yGi    (pGi unrestricted),  ∀i    (A6j) 
uGi = vGi   (πGi unrestricted),   ∀i   (A6k) 
(A6a-e) and (A6f-i) are the first-order conditions for problems (10) and (12), 
respectively, while (A6j-k) are the market clearing conditions (13) for energy 
and GEACs. 
  
The set of conditions (A6) is linearly dependent, because (A6j-k) imply (A6d).  
This implies that there are multiple equilibria.  In particular, it turns out that γG is 
arbitrary.  As a result, although the sum of the energy and GEAC price for any 
generator pGi + πGi is not arbitrary, the split between them is: given that a 
producer i’s output is positive, then by (A6a,b):  
 
pGi  = βG – γG ; πGi  =γG  + (T–Ei )αG ; pGi + πGi =  βG + (T–Ei )αG,   ∀i (A7) 
Any solution paying generators a total of βG + (T–Ei )αG for their output is an 
equilibrium, with the split between GEAC and energy revenues (determined by 
the arbitrary choice of γG) not mattering.  If we set γG = 0, then by (A6b), the GEAC 
price πGi = (T–Ei)αG, a la Gillenwater and Breidenich (2009).   
  
Now we show the equivalence of GEAC to a modified source-based system in 
which the original producer objective (2a) is altered so that each i receives K free 
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allowances for each MWh they sell and also a subsidy S $/MWh from LSEs, as 
claimed in Section 6.  (In this section, all variables and constants will have 
subscript S in this source-based system.)  The new version of (2a) would then be:  
 
MAX   Profit = (pSi – Ci – αSEi)ySi + αSKySi + SySi          (A8) 
{ySi} 
Meanwhile, the LSE objective (1a) is modified in parallel—they no longer receive 
the allowance auction revenues (as all KL allowances are now given away to 
producers) and furthermore they pay the producer subsidy for their entire load: 
 
 MIN ExpendituresS = Σi pSi xSi  + SL            (A9) 
            {xSi} 
The constraints are the same as in (1) and (2).   The resulting equilibrium 
conditions for this modified source-based system are the same as (A2) with the 
exception of the allowance allocation and subsidy terms in (A2a) and (A2c): 
 
 0 ≤ xSi ⊥ pSi  – βS  ≥ 0,      ∀i     (A2a′) 
 0 ≤ ySi ⊥ pSi  – Ci + αS (K-Ei ) + S – μSi ≤ 0, ∀i  (A2c′) 
This source-based equilibrium can be shown to be an equilibrium for the GEAC 
system, as claimed, if the subsidy S is defined as (T–K)αG.  The demonstration 
proceeds as follows.  First we simplify the GEAC model by eliminating several 
varables.   By (A6h), (A6j), and (A6k), we can eliminate uGi and vGi.   Now (A6j) 
and (A6k) are redundant, so we can eliminate one of those two conditions.  We 
can then add (A6a) and (A6b) together (since 0≤ x ⊥ f(X) ≥ 0 and 0≤ x ⊥ g(X) ≥ 0 
implies 0≤ x ⊥ f(X)+ g(X) ≥ 0), yielding  0 ≤ xGi ⊥ pGi + πGi  – βG – (T–Ei )αG ≥ 0.   
Similarly combining (A6f) and (A6g) yields 0 ≤ yGi ⊥ pGi +πGi – Ci – μGi  ≤ 0.  In the 
process, we’ve eliminated dual variables γG and θGi.   Finally, we note that the T 
terms on the right side of (A6e) cancel (as in (11), above.)   The result of the 
simplifications is that the GEAC equilibrium problem has been reduced to finding 
{xGi , yGi , pGi +πGi , αG, βG, μGi } such that: 
 
  0 ≤ xGi ⊥ pGi + πGi  – βG – (T–Ei )αG ≥ 0,      ∀i  (A10a) 
Σi xGi  = L   (βG unrestricted)     (A10b) 
0 ≤ αG ⊥ –Σi Ei yGi +K L ≥ 0         (A10c) 
 0 ≤ yGi ⊥ pGi +πGi – Ci – μGi  ≤ 0,    ∀i   (A10d) 
 0 ≤ μGi ⊥ yGi – CAPi ≤ 0, ∀i   (A10e) 
     xGi = yGi    (pGi +πGi unrestricted),  ∀i   (A10f) 
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Note that this system defines pGi +πGi (the sum of the energy and GEAC price), 
and not pGi and πGi separately, consistent with the arbitrary nature of γG, as 
explained above.    
  
The reduced GEAC conditions (A10) are equivalent to the modified source-based 
conditions (A2a′), (A2c′), (A2b), (A2d-f) because (a) a solution to one also solves 
the other and (b) the two systems’ profits and consumer costs are the same.   In 
particular, assume a solution {xGi , yGi , pGi +πGi , αG, βG, μGi }has been found to the 
GEAC model.  Now consider the modified source-based system assuming that the 
subsidy is set at S = (T–K )αG.   If instead of {xSi, ySi ,pSi, αS, βS, μSi} we substitute {xGi 
, yGi , pGi + πGi  – (T–Ei )αG , αG, βG, μGi } in the modified source-based conditions, the 
GEAC equilibrium conditions (A10) result.  Going the other way, assume that we 
have obtained a solution to the modified source-based model {xSi, ySi ,pSi, αS, βS, 
μSi} based upon S = (T–K)αG.   If we then substitute the resulting {xSi, ySi , pSi +(T–
Ei)αS, αS, βS, μSi} for {xGi , yGi , pGi +πGi , αG, βG, μGi } in the GEAC model (A10), we then 
get back the modified source-based conditions with that assumed subsidy. 
 
Finally, we need to show that profits and LSE expenditures are the same in the 
GEAC and modified source-based systems.  The GEAC profits (12a) and LSE 
expenditures (10a) can be shown to be the same as the modified source-based 
profit (A8) and expenditures (A9) by (i) substituting { pSi +(T–Ei)αS , S} for their 
equivalents{ pGi +πGi , (T–K )αG} in (12a) and (10a), (ii) noting that uGi = vGi = xGi = 
yGi, (iii) assuming that the emissions market constraint (7b) is binding, and then 
(iv) rearranging.   Thus, the GEAC market equilibrium is equivalent to a source-
based model in which LSEs pay energy subsidy (T–K )αG $/MWh to producers 
and allowances are granted freely to producers at rate K tons/MWh.   
 
Finally, we show that producer profits and consumer costs are independent of 
choice of default emissions rate T, as asserted in Section 6.  Consider solution {xGi 
, yGi , pGi +πGi , αG, βG, μGi }for a given T.   If we change T to T′, consider a candidate 
solution for T′, {xGi′ , yGi′ , pGi′+ πGi′ , βG′ , αG′ , μGi′} ≡ {xGi , yGi , pGi +πGi , αG, βG–(T′– 
T)αG, μGi}.  First, the primal variables {xGi , yGi} still satisfy (A10) for the new T′ , as 
those variables appear only in equalities (A10b,f), the left sides of (A10a,d) and 
the right sides of (A10c,e,), and those conditions do not depend on T.   
Meanwhile, the price variables {pGi +πGi , αG, βG–(T′– T)αG, μGi} satisfy (A10b-f), 
since T does not appear in any of those conditions and there is no restriction on 
βG′.  Finally, the prices also satisfy (A10a), as there is no change in the value of its 
right side of (A10a): its value under T (= pGi + πGi  – βG – (T–Ei )αG) is the same as 
under T′ (= pGi + πGi  – (βG –(T′– T)αG ) – (T′ –Ei )αG).   Therefore, if {xGi , yGi , pGi +πGi , 
αG, μGi} is an equilibrium under one value of T, it is an equilibrium under any 
value.   This implies that profits and expenditures are unaffected by T since they 
depend only on {xGi , yGi , pGi +πGi , αG}.     
 
A.3   Relationships of CO2RC and Source-Based Systems  
We start with Source-Based System II’s equilibrium conditions. As mentioned in 
Section 7, these are the same as the equilibrium conditions for CO2RC.  They are 
developed from the producer and LSE models in the same way that (A1a)-(A1f) 
were derived in Appendix A.1 from the Source-Based System I models in Section 
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2.  Indeed, the equilibrium conditions are the same as for Source-Based System I 
with two exceptions: subscript SII replaces SI in all variables, and (A2c′) replaces 
(A2c): 
 
 0 ≤ ySIIi ⊥ pSIIi  – Ci + αSII (T –Ei) –μSIIi  ≤ 0, ∀i (A2c′) 
Further, the equilibrium conditions for Source-Based System III are the same as 
for System II, except that all variables have subscripts SIII and condition (A2c′) is 
replaced by:  
 
 0 ≤ ySIIIi ⊥ pSIIIi  – Ci + αSIII (K –Ei) –μSIIIi  ≤ 0, ∀i (A2c″) 
The claim in Section 7 is that the equilibria for the three source-based systems 
are related as follows:    
 
     {xSIi, ySIi , αSI , βSI , μSIi} = {xSIIi , ySIIi , αSII , βSII , μSIIi} = {xSIIIi , ySIIIi , αSIII , βSIII , μSIIIi}  
(A11a) 
      pSIi  = pSIIi + αSII T = pSIIIi + αSIII K     (A11b) 
      ProfitSI   = ProfitSII   = ProfitSIII     (A11c) 
      ExpendituresSI   = ExpendituresSII   = ExpendituresSIII  (A11d) 
(A11a) and (A11b) are established as follows.  By substituting the SII terms from 
(A11a) and (A11b) into the Source-Based System I equilibrium conditions (A2a)-
(A2f), the result is the Source-Based System II equilibrium conditions.  The 
reverse can also be shown by substituting the SI terms into the Source-Based 
System II equilibrium conditions.   Likewise, this can be done with Systems I and 
III as well as II and III.  This establishes that the solution for one system is also an 
equilibrium for the others, if the energy price adjustment (A11b) is made.   Since 
by assumption T>K>0, (A8b) then implies that System I (producers pay for all 
allowances) has higher energy prices than System III (producers receive free 
allowances at rate K per MWh of production), whose energy prices in turn 
exceed those of System II/CO2RC (equivalent to producers getting T free 
allowances per MWh output). 
  
Finally (A11c) and (A11d) are demonstrated by inserting one source-based 
system’s energy and allowance prices in another system’s profit and expenditure 
functions, and then noting (for expenditures) that Σi xi = L (as at the end of 
Appendix A.1).   As a result, the second system’s functions reduce to those of the 
first system.  This can be done for any pair of the systems (I, II, or III).  Thus, the 
profits from the three source-based systems and CO2RC are equal, and so are LSE 
expenditures.   
 
